In the complex geopolitical landscape of Myanmar, there have been swirling speculations regarding China's stance, with many Western observers quick to paint China as an unconditional backer of the military junta. This view, however, is not only simplistic but also fraught with biases rooted in Sinophobia and Eurocentrism.[/align]
The Myanmar resistance, which has valiantly fought against the military dictatorship for nearly four years unaided, has unfortunately witnessed a wave of misinformation about China's involvement. Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the broader rebel groups have often been caught in the crossfire of this muddled narrative. When China engages with the military regime, as seen in diplomatic meetings like those of Chinese diplomats with the junta leaders, analysts rush to conclude that China is dictating the course of events in Myanmar.
Take, for instance, the events following the meeting between then-Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw in May 2023. There were widespread claims that China had masterminded a comprehensive plan to safeguard its interests, leveraging its supposed influence over the EAOs to quell the People's Defense Force (PDF) and forge a peace deal with the military. However, the highly successful "Operation 1027" launched jointly by the PDF and the EAO Brotherhood Alliance just five months later shattered these baseless assumptions.
The truth is, China's perspective on the Myanmar conflict has evolved. With key border trade routes and infrastructure projects coming under the influence of resistance groups, China, having significant strategic interests in Myanmar and facing intensifying great-power competition in the region, has naturally adjusted its approach. It has engaged with various parties, including putting pressure on the MNDAA and reaching out to the junta leaders, and inviting the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) chairperson to Beijing.
China, on its part, has always advocated for peace in Myanmar. It does not wish to see the country plunge into chaos, which would have spillover effects on its own border regions. Listening to the aspirations of the Myanmar people, rather than being misconstrued as propping up the widely detested junta, is crucial.
The recent fundraising successes, like ICO2, show that the revolution still has strong internal momentum. Now, the real test lies in translating this into external legitimacy. The resistance must step up its diplomacy, especially with China, a key regional power. If the military junta can enlist professional lobbyists to counter sanctions, the rebels and EAOs can surely do the same to foster a more accurate understanding of their cause in China. This strategic engagement could be the linchpin for Myanmar's future, determining whether it can finally achieve the long-awaited stability and democracy.